Influenza Pandemic Periodicity, Virus Recycling, and the Art of Risk Assessment by Dowdle, Walter R.
Influenza pandemic risk assessment is an uncertain
art. The theory that influenza A virus pandemics occur
every 10 to 11 years and seroarcheologic evidence of virus
recycling set the stage in early 1976 for risk assessment
and risk management of the Fort Dix, New Jersey, swine
influenza outbreak. Additional data and passage of time
proved the theory untenable. Much has been learned about
influenza A virus and its natural history since 1976, but the
exact conditions that lead to the emergence of a pandemic
strain are still unknown. Current avian influenza events par-
allel those of swine influenza in 1976 but on a larger and
more complex scale. Pre- and postpandemic risk assess-
ment and risk management are continuous but separate
public health functions. 
“I am sure that what any of us do, we will be criticized
either for doing too much or for doing too little…. If an
epidemic does not occur, we will be glad. If it does, then I
hope we can say… that we have done everything and made
every preparation possible to do the best job within the
limits of available scientific knowledge and administrative
procedure.”
—US Surgeon General Leroy Burney, 
Meeting of the Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officers, August 28, 1957 (1)
I
n 1941, on the eve of US entry into World War II, con-
cern about a repeat of the 1918 influenza pandemic and
its effect on armed forces led the US military to establish
the Commission on Influenza (later combined with other
commissions to become the present Armed Forces
Epidemiological Board) and place high priority on devel-
oping a vaccine (2). Pandemic influenza did not material-
ize, but the vaccine did. The first successful large-scale
influenza vaccine field trials were completed in 1943 (3).
In 1947, failure of the vaccine to provide protection
against the epidemic influenza type A antigenic variant
confirmed concerns of vaccine obsolescence and led to the
term “antigenic shift” (4) and designation of the 1947 FM1
strain by the Commission on Influenza as subgroup A′ on
the basis of the hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test.
In May 1957, with reports of a potential influenza pan-
demic in the Far East, risk assessment responsibilities of
the Commission on Influenza were clear. The Department
of Defense influenza immunization policy of 1954 man-
dated quick formulation and provision of a new vaccine.
The Public Health Service had no such official policy and
found risk assessment to be a challenging process that
relied heavily on international sources for surveillance and
the Influenza Commission for advice. “There was no indi-
cation it would become a killer of the 1918 variety, but nei-
ther was there positive assurance it would not” (1). Risk
management was contingent on evidence of “continued
low mortality” or “increased virulence” (1). The consensus
by late June was probable sporadic local occurrences dur-
ing the summer with an epidemic during fall or winter that
would bring only a relatively small increase in deaths. On
August 28, the Surgeon General recommended immuniza-
tion through established physician-patient channels. The
watchword was to “alert but not alarm” the public and to
generate interest in receiving the vaccine (1).
The 1957 Asian virus pandemic simultaneously
increased knowledge of influenza pandemics and the com-
plexity of future pandemic risk assessments. The pandem-
ic had appeared exactly 10 years after appearance of the A′
virus, which suggested pandemic periodicity (5).
Preexisting HI antibodies to the 1957 A2/Asian virus in
sera collected before the pandemic were reported for some
persons >75 years of age, which suggested that human
influenza viruses were recycling (6).
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Georgia, USAIn July 1968, with reports of influenza epidemics again
appearing in the Far East, the US Military Commission on
Influenza quickly obtained strains and recommended a
new vaccine (2). Risk assessment by the Public Health
Service this time around was a much simpler process.
Annual vaccine recommendations to physicians for per-
sons at high risk for death or severe complications were by
now a matter of course. The need for a new vaccine was
apparent (7), but early reports consistently described the
disease as mild (8), and the US epidemic was over before
the A2/Hong Kong virus was recognized as an antigenic
shift (9,10).
The 1968 pandemic added to the complexities of risk
assessment. The new subtype had appeared, right on time,
11 years after the 1957 Asian pandemic and replaced the
dominant influenza A2/Asian virus subtype, as had the
viruses of 1947 and 1957. Further, most persons >85 years
of age had preexisting antibodies to the 1968 virus, which
suggested that the hemagglutinin of this virus, as well as
that of the 1957 virus, had appeared previously in the
human population (11).
In 1976, speculation was rife that a new pandemic
strain was due in a few years. The concept of 10- to 11-
year influenza A virus pandemic patterns, with disappear-
ance of the predecessor virus, seemed entrenched in the
influenza literature. Previous influenza pandemics had
occurred in 1968, before that in 1957, and before that in
1947; carrying the logic further, pandemics also occurred
in 1929, 1918, 1900, and 1890 (12). The concept was sup-
ported by the World Health Organization (WHO) classifi-
cation scheme, which implied that 4 influenza A subtypes
had occurred in humans since 1933. In addition, seroarche-
ologic findings had been interpreted as evidence that the
swine virus had last appeared in 1918, the Hong Kong
virus (now designated H3) in 1900, and the Asian (H2)
virus in 1890, not exactly 10–11 years apart, but in the
same order (13,14). To some, the next pandemic virus in
the sequence was the swine virus of 1918 (13).
On February 13, 1976, the New York Times published
a guest editorial to remind the public and policy makers
that influenza pandemics had marked the end of every
decade—every 11 years—since the 1940s. The editorial
urged accelerated pandemic planning and coordinated vac-
cine research (15).
Risk Assessment in 1976
Coincidentally, on February 14, 1976, the day after the
Times editorial was published, the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) hosted an emergency meeting with the US
Army, Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes
of Health, and New Jersey State Health Department to
assess the isolation of swine influenza virus from the late
January outbreak at Fort Dix, New Jersey (16).
Information was insufficient at the time to assess whether
the swine influenza virus outbreak was a unique event in
susceptible young recruits or the beginning of a pandemic,
but the isolation of a predicted potential pandemic strain
almost on schedule did not go unnoticed.
On March 10, the Army provided data to the US
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices that con-
firmed person-to-person transmission of swine influenza
virus (17). The single swine influenza death loomed large,
although most cases were mild. No one at the advisory
committee meeting equated the disease potential of this
virus with 1918, but the association of swine influenza
virus with the most devastating pandemic in memory was
widely speculated in the news media. Slightly more than
a month after the outbreak, no evidence suggested that a
pandemic would or would not occur; a situation such as
the Fort Dix outbreak had never been encountered. On
March 18, the action memo from the Assistant Secretary
of Health to the Secretary, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare stated that “severe epidemics, or
pandemics, of influenza occur at approximately 10-year
intervals” and publicly linked swine flu with the pandem-
ic of 1918 (18).
When WHO convened a meeting of consultants in
Geneva on April 7 (19), 3 months had passed without evi-
dence of further swine virus transmission anywhere in the
world. The swine A/New Jersey strain had not replaced the
current A/Victoria strain, which continued to circulate at
Fort Dix well into February, and no evidence of
swine/Victoria virus reassortants had been seen. Theories
of what might happen were being overtaken by the reali-
ties of what was happening. The Fort Dix outbreak was
beginning to look like an isolated event.
A report from the United Kingdom on the behavior of
swine influenza virus in infected human volunteers would
not appear in Nature for some weeks (20), but in April
early rumors circulated that swine A/New Jersey virus was
more infectious than classic swine virus but that the symp-
toms were mild to moderate. The report added little to risk
assessment; the findings were consistent with events seen
in the outbreak. But an accompanying editorial in Nature
summarized the UK and likely European view, which
urged caution in vaccine stockpiling and immunization
programs and continuing assessment, “until the shape of
things to come can be seen more clearly” (21).
Beginning in April and continuing into May, a group of
US investigators used the Delphi technique to obtain an
expert risk assessment with minimal bias (22). The 15 par-
ticipating scientists and epidemiologists concluded that if
swine influenza virus were to circulate in the United
States, the epidemic would more likely resemble those of
1957 and 1968 than that of 1918. The probability of further
swine influenza virus outbreaks was estimated at 0.10.
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on a fatal respiratory illness among American
Legionnaires attending a convention in Philadelphia
(18,23). Wide but inappropriate speculation that the cause
of these unprecedented deaths might be swine influenza,
accompanied by equally unprecedented national publicity,
precluded further opportunity for rational risk assessment.
Theory of Predictable Pandemics
Unknowingly, at the same time as the Fort Dix out-
break, the Working Group on Pandemic Influenza met in
Rougemont, Switzerland, on January 26–28. Issues
addressed included the growing body of evidence linking
the origin of antigenic shift to animal reservoirs of influen-
za viruses (24), the questionable validity of predictable
patterns of pandemic periodicity, and the appropriate clas-
sification of the 1947 strain (25).
When the 1947 epidemic occurred, only 13 years had
passed since the first influenza virus was isolated.
Available scientific knowledge was limited. No precedent
existed for defining a pandemic strain or distinguishing
antigenic shift (a complete change) from antigenic drift
(point mutations resulting in accumulated amino acid
changes). The 1957 Asian pandemic virus provided the
first evidence of a true antigenic shift. The hemagglutinin
and neuraminidase surface antigens were totally different
from those of their 1956 predecessors. The 1968 Hong
Kong pandemic virus provided evidence that antigenic
shift can occur in the hemagglutinin independent of the
neuraminidase, which was largely unchanged. The 1947
strain failed to meet the definition of an antigenic shift.
The 1971 revision of the system of nomenclature (26)
recognized the independence of the 2 surface antigens and
linked antigenic shifts with influenza A virus subtypes but
further confounded the issue by designating the 1947 strain
as a subtype for historical reasons. In the 1980 revision,
which combined antigenically closely related subtypes
regardless of source of isolation (27), the previous hemag-
glutinin designations of swine (Hsw1) and human H0 and
H1 subtypes became H1N1, ending a misclassification of
the 1947 strain that had endured for >30 years. 
Thus, counting 1890, a total of 4 recognized pandemics
have been separated by 28 years (1918), 39 years (1957),
and 11 years (1968). Excluding the emergence of the
H1N1 virus in 1977, an additional 38 years have elapsed
since the last pandemic. No predictable pattern of pandem-
ic periodicity exists.
Pandemic Virus Recycling
In 1935, high levels of antibodies to the newly isolated
influenza viruses from humans (28) and swine (29) were
commonly seen among persons >10 years of age, which
suggested that the 1918–1920 pandemic had been caused
by the same or a closely related virus. The birth dates asso-
ciated with the peak prevalence of swine virus (H1) anti-
bodies did not change in sera collected 12, 17, or 20 years
later (30). The seroarcheologic findings were validated in
1999 by sequencing the HA gene recovered from persons
who died of influenza during the pandemic (31). Thus,
swine (H1) virus was present from 1918 to 1920 and left a
lifelong immunologic imprint on most persons who were
<25 years of age at the time. Validation of the H1
seroarcheologic model allowed reexamination of earlier
reports of preexisting H2 (1957) and H3 (1968) antibodies
in sera collected from elderly persons before the respective
pandemics (32).
Serologic Findings Linking 1890 with H3
After 1957, preexisting H2 antibodies were not com-
monly observed. Three laboratories reported preexisting
H2 antibodies among the elderly, while 3 other laborato-
ries found no orientation of H2 antibody toward any par-
ticular age group. Further, peak antibody prevalence from
the 2 primary laboratories (6,30) differed by nearly 8
years. The lack of agreement among investigators and the
low levels and low titers of H2 antibodies suggest either
differences in test specificity, sensitivity, or both. More
recent application of the seroarcheologic model failed to
confirm the proposed link of preexisting H2 antibodies
with the 1890 pandemic (32).
In contrast, preexisting high levels of H3 antibodies
among persons >85 years of age in 1968 were common
findings in all serologic tests. Some investigators linked
the origin of preexisting H3 antibodies to the minor 1900
pandemic (11,14), whereas others favored the 1890 pan-
demic (33). Observations from recent application of the
validated H1 seroarcheologic model to published data
linked preexisting H3 antibodies to the pandemic of 1890
(32).
We can reasonably conclude that the virus (H3) with
the highest HI antibody titers and highest peak antibody
prevalence (>90%) in the elderly resulted not from an epi-
demic (1900) but a pandemic (1890). The virus (H2) with
the lowest HI antibody titers and seroprevalence
(15%–29%) in the elderly is an unlikely candidate for the
most severe influenza event of the late 19th century.
Epidemiologic Findings Linking 1890 with H3
Population immunity against the shared neuraminidase
(N2) antigens between the 1968 H3N2 pandemic strain
and its H2N2 predecessor is believed to have contributed
to the low number of deaths observed in 1968 and 1969
(12). However, more dramatic was the selective sharp
decrease in expected excess deaths among persons born
before 1893. In the 1970 wave that followed, no excess
deaths occurred in persons born before 1885 (34).
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born before 1890 were two thirds lower than among per-
sons born after 1899 (35), further linking H3 with 1890.
Unclear Evidence for H2 Recycling
No single, simple explanation has been proposed for
the reported low levels of preexisting H2 antibodies before
1957. Whether these antibodies, if specific, represented
cross-reactions stimulated by a related virus or by the H3
virus itself is uncertain. Evidence against specificity (or at
least prevalence) of H2 antibodies is the absence of any
obvious protective effect among persons >75 years of age
during the 1957–1958 pandemic, which is in stark contrast
to the strong correlation of prepandemic antibodies with
protection in 1968 and 1969 (H3) and 1977 (H1) (36).
Linking H2 to 1890 and H3 to 1900 may have been a
historical accident. The reports of preexisting low levels of
H2 antibody in persons >75 years of age predated the H3
findings by 10 years. Thus, H2 antibodies were attributed
to the 1890 pandemic, the only accepted pandemic around
that period. When preexisting high levels of H3 antibody
were recognized in essentially the same age cohort in
1968, the 1890 pandemic slot had already been taken.
Lack of Evidence for H1 Recycling
Researchers have long speculated (3) that preexisting
H1 antibody among the elderly in 1918 accounted for the
well-known “W” excess death curve (37). Theories of spe-
cial protection of the population >40 years of age compete
with theories of extraordinary vulnerability of young
adults. But given the continued increase in the death rate
curve (albeit dampened) among those >65 years of age in
1918 (37) and the remarkably low death rate among those
with preexisting antibodies in 1968 (H3) and 1977 (H1),
evidence of H1 recycling in 1918 is not compelling. With
the passage of time and the absence of sera collected from
persons >40 years of age before the 1918 pandemic, the
issue of H1 recycling is difficult to resolve. 
H1 reappeared, of course, in 1977, but evidence sug-
gests that the 1977 H1N1 virus reemergence was not a nat-
ural event (38,39). Transmission of the mild H1N1 for >25
years, primarily among those born after 1957, coupled
with the previous natural transmission among persons born
before 1956, completes the H1N1 immunologic experi-
ence of all age groups. If a natural recycling sequence ever
existed, present population immunity precludes H1 as a
pandemic candidate for years to come. 
Solid evidence of recycling exists for a single subtype,
H3, which (likely with an equine N8 neuraminidase [40])
caused the pandemic of 1890 and reemerged with the N2
neuraminidase in 1968. Thus, in the last 115 years, the
influenza Avirus hemagglutinin had recycled in humans at
least once, after 79 years. Neuraminidase subtypes during
this same period of time were N8 (1890), N1 (1918), and
N2 (1957 and 1968) (40). No evidence of neuraminidase
recycling has been seen.
Lessons from 1976
Swine influenza virus was isolated in the United States
from humans for the first time in 1974, just 2 years before
the Fort Dix outbreak (41). Additional swine virus infec-
tions of humans were confirmed by serologic evidence and
virus isolation in 1975 and 1976, with a least 1 suggested
incident of person-to-person spread other than the Fort Dix
outbreak. Increased recognition of swine influenza infec-
tions may have been a matter of increased surveillance,
number of susceptible humans, or swine virus transmissi-
bility. Human experimental studies (20) and virologic find-
ings (42) suggest the latter. 
Influenza virus eradication in swine was recommended
by WHO in 1976 (19), but such action was not taken
because of major biologic challenges and absence of
resources. Today, even if pandemic risk were absent, the
economic loss from infected poultry and mounting human
illness and death are compelling reasons in themselves to
place highest priority on avian influenza virus control.
Risk Assessment Limited by Available Knowledge
The major lesson from 1976 was that increased animal-
to-human transmission and major outbreaks of a novel
influenza virus do not necessarily lead to pandemics, at
least in the short term. However, knowledge of the Fort
Dix outbreak and evidence that swine influenza
virus/H3N2 reassortants could occur in pigs under condi-
tions of natural transmission (24) likely would have gener-
ated concerns for years about swine influenza transmission
to humans had not H1N1 virus reappeared in the human
population in 1977. 
Since 1976, available knowledge of the influenza A
virus and its natural history has expanded greatly. Multiple
experimental studies have better defined conditions for
virus mutation and the creation of reassortants.
Opportunities for human exposure and the current number
of incidences of avian virus transmission to human are
unprecedented in modern times, but in 2005, as in 1976,
the precise conditions that lead to the emergence of a pan-
demic strain are unknown. 
Concern of Virus Recycling 
In recent history, influenza virus recycling has occurred
twice, once through the natural process (H3 in1968) and
once likely through human negligence (H1 in 1977)
(38,39). If human influenza Aepidemics are restricted to 3
subtypes, as some have speculated, and if H1 and H3 are
presently in circulation, then only H2 remains. The risk of
H2 reemerging in humans through an act of nature is
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human negligence is all too real.
In the published report of the April 7, 1976, WHO
meeting of international experts, the final paragraph urged
extreme caution in developing live vaccines from A/New
Jersey strains (H1N1) because of the possible danger of
spread to susceptible human or animal hosts (19). That
paragraph was written specifically to respond to reports
that several investigators outside Western Europe had
plans to develop and test such vaccines. One year later, an
H1N1 virus, identical to the laboratory strain from1950–
1951, swept the world.
In an incident earlier this year, H2N2 virus was acciden-
tally distributed in proficiency testing panels to laboratories
in 18 countries. Recognizing the potential danger, CDC and
WHO issued a health advisory on April 13, 2005, to destroy
all such samples and followed on May 3 with recommenda-
tions to increase biosafety levels for H2N2. Laboratory
containment of H2N2 strains is crucial. No one born since
1968, including many laboratory staff, is immune. The
level of compliance with these biosafety recommendations
in all areas of the world is unknown. Focusing on the theo-
retical risk for natural H2 emergence and ignoring the real
risk in our own laboratories would be tragic. 
Risk Assessment Separate from Risk Management
Internationally, influenza risk assessment and risk man-
agement are separate functions. WHO makes risk assess-
ments in the form of annual recommendations on influenza
vaccine composition. Nations may elect to accept WHO
findings and recommendations or to have their own risk
assessment bodies that incorporate WHO findings. Risk
management, on the other hand, is the exclusive responsi-
bility of national governments. Independent expert bodies
may make recommendations, but risk management ulti-
mately is a political process, performed and funded by fed-
eral and state governments.
Nationally, risk assessment should also be a separate
scientific function, free from influence by perceived risk-
management resource constraints, organizational capaci-
ties, or political aspirations. Pandemic risk management,
itself an uncertain art, must independently weigh ongoing
risk-assessment findings in the context of actions that best
serve national and international interests. 
Dr Dowdle is a member of The Task Force for Child
Survival and Development, Atlanta, Georgia. His current scien-
tific interests include polio, HIV, and influenza. 
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